Japan as a Nonnuclear Superpower: Responding to North Korea with Economic Sanctions
Topic: Nuclear

 

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

 

     Controversy has erupted lately in Japan in the wake of North Korea’s nuclear test. The debate is over whether Japan should even debate whether to acquire nuclear weapons of its own.

 

      Certain powerful legislators in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have asserted that, now that a hostile neighbor has nukes, the Japanese must at least be willing to discuss whether they should get some of their own. Prime Minister Abe has displayed a tolerant attitude toward these pronouncements, ostensibly in the interests of respecting free speech. The opposition parties, however, fiercely oppose such discussions and their timing, claiming that they are merely an attempt to justify the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan.

 

      Most Japanese citizens were shocked at the sudden breaking of a decades-long taboo against such talk by government officials. Many considered it contradictory at the least to castigate North Korea for going nuclear on the one hand while suggesting that Japan might be wise to do the same on the other.

 

    Many Americans feel that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought an early end to the Second World War and thus saved more lives than they sacrificed. And during the Cold War, the possession of nuclear weapons was generally viewed as a deterrent to all-out nuclear war. Consequently Americans may find it difficult to understand the intense opposition of so many Japanese to even a discussion of the possibility of acquiring such weapons.

 

     The reasons for this attitude gap may lie in a profound difference in how Japanese and Americans view war. The predominant American view seems to be that war is a legitimate undertaking when fought for the sake of liberty or justice. To the average Japanese, however, war is a crime, a cruel act of slaughter and destruction. And nuclear bombs are viewed as the cruelest weapons of all.

 

     The Japanese attitude stems from the nation’s experience during the last century, when the government’s buildup of a massive military force, control of the education and thought of the citizenry, and glorification of war culminated in the worst catastrophe to ever befall Japan. When some Japanese begin arguing in earnest about the virtues of first-strike capability and nuclear deterrence, others inevitably feel a twinge of conscience and apprehension.

 

    Yet the Japanese aversion to war was cultivated by none other than the United States. After the Second World War, the U.S. feared that Japan might someday again become a military superpower and threaten American supremacy in Asia and the Pacific. So in exchange for allowing Japan to rearm itself with only conventional weapons, the U.S. guaranteed the country’s safety under its own defense umbrella.

 

    Whatever its origins, most Japanese are grateful for this enforced pacifism. For the past 60 years Japan has not been embroiled in a single major war, has not been attacked by another country, and has grown into an economic giant.

 

    In the wake of its nuclear test, North Korea announced that it would regard economic sanctions as a declaration of war. But Japan is not really afraid of North Korea’s newfound nuclear capability. Instead of responding by developing its own nukes, Japan has joined forces with other nations to impose tough economic sanctions on the country. Indeed, Japan is a rarity among superpowers today in its foregoing of nuclear deterrence as a national defense policy. In the 61st year of the nuclear age, Japan boasts the world’s second greatest economy, yet it is a nonnuclear superpower.

    If anything, North Korea’s nuclear test reminded the Japanese people that they do not need to depend on nuclear weapons to be a superpower.

 

    Motoaki Kamiura is a Tokyo-based military analyst. When the world is in crisis, he appears frequently on national television programs.

    Alan Gleason is an editor, writer, and Japanese-English translator. He lives in Tokyo.

 

Abe's Magic Trick: Don't Revise the Constitution, Just Re-Define It
Topic: Self-Defense Force

A Perspective from Japan (October 2006)

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By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

 

Shinzo Abe has a reputation as a super-hawk who has argued in the past that Japan was justified in waging the Pacific War, and that the Class-A war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni are not really guilty. Now that he is prime minister, major changes can be expected in Japan’s defense strategy. Perhaps the most significant change will be the lifting of Japan’s self-imposed ban on “collective defense” -- in other words, joint combat operations with the United States.

 

Japan’s Constitution expressly prohibits military action except when Japan itself is attacked by another country. Thus the Self-Defense Forces cannot even fight in tandem with U.S. forces under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, but must always be under separate command. The logic is that this separation is required because Japan’s constitutionally recognized military objectives are necessarily different from U.S. military objectives. In short, Japan is prohibited from engaging in “collective defense” with the U.S. or anyone else.

 

In recent years, however, complaints grew louder that this was too strict an interpretation of the Constitution, one that hampered Japan’s ability to respond to emergencies in its immediate vicinity. In 1999 a law was passed permitting the SDF to provide backup to U.S. forces, but only in “situations in areas surrounding Japan.” That is why, when SDF forces are dispatched to more outlying regions such as the Indian Ocean or Iraq, they are still not allowed to directly engage in joint combat operations with U.S. forces.

 

Suppose a Japanese warship were cruising alongside a U.S. ship in the Indian Ocean, and the U.S. ship was attacked. Under the logic that prohibits Japan from engaging in collective defense, the Japanese ship could do nothing to help. During his recent election campaign, Abe frequently cited this scenario in asserting the need to revise Japan’s defense stance to allow the SDF to fight alongside U.S. forces.

 

The Self-Defense Forces were created, and grew during Japan’s period of rapid economic growth, without a thought for the possibility of their engaging in combat overseas. The government’s policy was from the outset one of self-defense only. Today, however, this notion of “exclusive self-defense” is treated as obsolete. For one thing, an SDF whose sole mission is self-defense really has no mission at all anymore, for the simple reason that Japan has no real enemies: not even China or North Korea would consider invading Japan itself.

 

Abe has declared that it is no longer feasible to skirt the issue f constitutionality by “interpreting” the Constitution; rather, he intends to confront the issue head-on by simply re-defining Japan’s right to engage in collective defense. Until now, the government has taken the position that it could not lift the ban on collective defense without an actual revision to the Constitution. To get around this conundrum it has engaged in all kinds of semantic legerdemain, notably its “interpretation” that the Constitution actually recognizes Japan’s right to collective defense, but not the exercise of this right.  Now, however, Abe says, this “interpretation” strategy has reached its limit.

 

But, he also asserts, there is not time to wait for the parliament and public opinion to reach a consensus on revising the Constitution. Japan must abolish its restrictions on collective defense by re-defining it. That is the most significant change the Abe administration will bring to Japan’s defense policy.

 

Motoaki Kamiura is a Tokyo-based military analyst. When the world is in crisis, he appears frequently on national television programs.

Alan Gleason is an editor, writer, and Japanese-English translator. He lives in Tokyo.

 

Aftermath of the Taepodong Furor: North Korea Loses Its Diplomacy Card
Topic: North Korea

A Perspective from Japan

 

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

 

     On July 5 North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles: three Scuds, three Nodongs, and one new model, the Taepodong 2. However, the Taepodong exploded after only 40 seconds in the air, disappearing from the screens of the U.S. military radar that were tracking it.

 

     No sooner were the missiles in the air than Japan went into hysterics. This time, however, unlike the furor aroused by the launch of the Taepodong 1 in August 1998, Japan’s reaction was less about the Taepodong 2, a long-range ballistic missile developed to reach the United States.

 

     To Japan, the bigger threat is the Nodong, whose range encompasses the entire Japanese archipelago. As for the short-range Scuds, it was assumed that their ostensible target is the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.

 

     With the failure of the Taepodong, the United States was in a position to breathe easier. The government of South Korea, in keeping with its “sunshine policy” of recent years, for its part refrained from harshly criticizing the North. Instead, it criticized the Japanese government for overreacting to the missile tests.

 

    Nonetheless, Japan went ahead and appealed to the United Nations Security Council to impose heavy sanctions on North Korea for threatening the peace of the region. In the end the Council rejected wording that would have backed sanctions with the threat of military force.

 

     However, the entire Council, including Russia and China, did adopt a resolution condemning North Korea for launching the missiles. This was a significant development in that it was the first time Japan had sponsored a Security Council resolution and seen it unanimously adopted, albeit in compromise form.

 

     Then, at the G8 Summit held in St. Petersburg, Russia later that month, the Chair’s Summary presented at the end of the summit expressed support for the U.N.’s condemnation of North Korea and urged a speedy resolution of the abduction issue as well. Japan’s views had clearly gained acceptance.

 

     With these gestures North Korea suddenly found itself facing a united front of international opposition. Its only remaining diplomatic card, the missile tests, had been neutralized. With its nuclear weapons development card already taken out of play through its participation in the six-way talks, North Korea was now bereft of its last two brinkmanship cards.

 

    From this point on, North Korea’s neighbors will begin preparing for the eventual collapse of the country’s government. Their top priority will be to deliver food and medical supplies to the North Koreans as quickly as possible in order to prevent a massive exodus of refugees into surrounding countries.

 

    Japan is already holding secret consultations about such measures, including the use of its national stockpile of rice for this purpose.

 

Motoaki Kamiura is a Tokyo-based military analyst. When the world is in crisis, he appears frequently on national television programs.

   

   Alan Gleason is an editor, writer, and Japanese-English translator. He lives in Tokyo.

 

 

The Camp Schwab Heliport Plan: Another Narita Mess in the Making?
Topic: Okinawa
December 2005 Cultural News

A Perspective from Japan:

The Camp Schwab Heliport Plan: Another Narita Mess in the Making?

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

A new controversy has erupted in Okinawa, where the debate over the U.S. military presence is already at fever pitch. The latest outcry is over a proposal to build a new helicopter base for the U.S. Marines at Camp Schwab.

The existing helicopter facility at the Marines’ Futenma Air Station in central Okinawa is surrounded by a densely populated residential area, where noise and the danger of helicopter accidents have become major issues for local residents. To reduce tensions, the Japanese and U.S. governments agreed on a plan to move Marine chopper operations from Futenma to Camp Scwhab in a more outlying part of the island.

The heliport would be built on the coast inside the base perimeter. Part of the 1800-meter runway and apron would occupy land where a military barracks now sits, but part of it would be built atop land reclaimed offshore.

The problem is that the two governments agreed to this plan without consulting or even informing local citizens. Neither the governor of Okinawa nor mayors in the affected districts were consulted.

The predictable result was an outcry from the Okinawans. Erstwhile supporters of the new base, who had anticipated a huge public works windfall, were disappointed to learn that most of the facility would be built much more cheaply onshore. Earlier plans had called for building the entire runway offshore, atop a coral reef. Meanwhile, residents near Camp Schwab opposed the onshore site because the helicopters would fly right over their homes. Joining those opposed to any base construction whatsoever were environmentalists who argued that offshore construction would threaten the habitat of the endangered dugong.

To reduce the burden borne by Okinawa, the U.S. military announced that it would return Futenma Air Station to the prefecture and move the command headquarters of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force and 7,000 troops from Okinawa to Guam. Yet despite this pledge, 90 percent of all Okinawans oppose the construction of the heliport at Camp Schwab.

The problem lies with the hasty behavior of the Japanese government, which blithely assumed that the locals would readily agree to a deal involving less landfill and hence less damage to the maritime environment than the original offshore plan.

When Japan’s mass media began covering local protests against the plan, powerful politicians from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party began paying visits to Okinawa. Ostensibly they went for the purpose of “explaining” the U.S.-Japan agreement, but according to some reports they also conveyed a threat: to freeze the 100 billion yen (US$840 million) in government funding earmarked for development of the island’s north shore, if the protests did not stop.

And this is not the only financial help that Okinawans expect from the government. They also want unemployment assistance for the many civilians who will lose their jobs if bases are closed as part of the U.S. military’s “transformation” project. Government aid is also sought for the maintenance of vacated base property, compensation to landowners, and further development funding for affected districts.

The fact that the Japanese and American governments agreed on a new heliport without even discussing these issues is what particularly outrages the Okinawans.

Japan has already promised the U.S. that it will complete the Camp Schwab heliport in five years. If the government unilaterally goes ahead with construction without obtaining the consent of the local populace, it is a recipe for a real fiasco. The last time something like this happened was thirty years ago, when the government began construction of Narita Airport near Tokyo without consulting the farmers living on the land.

There is now a real possibility that the Camp Schwab heliport will turn into a reincarnation of the Narita controversy.

Will China Swallow Up the Korean Peninsula? (Part 2)
Topic: China
October 2005 Cultural News

A Perspective from Japan
Will China Swallow Up the Korean Peninsula? (Part 2)

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst
Translated by Alan Gleason

History shows that nations built on peninsulas, such as Italy or Korea, tend to become battlegrounds for hegemony between continental powers invading from the mainland and maritime powers invading from the sea.

If Russia or China seeks to expand, the geopolitical characteristics of the Korean Peninsula make it an optimum route by which either of these land-based powers could extend their influence off the coast of Asia. Conversely, if Japan or the United States wishes to expand its sphere of influence on the Asian continent, the same peninsula offers the perfect beachhead.

Lately there have been some curious developments on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s industrial infrastructure is a shambles. The country lacks electricity, an adequate telephone network, or the roads and railroads necessary to transport goods in any quantity. But suddenly, Chinese money is pouring into this same infrastructure. From US$400 million in 2000, China’s annual investment in North Korea jumped to US$1.5 billion in 2004 – twice the amount invested by South Korea.

When Japan annexed and ruled the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945, it pursued a colonial policy of industrial development by exploiting the mineral resources in the North. Now, with its eye on that same underground wealth, China is building new factories in North Korea and increasing its imports of these resources. The North, which is particularly blessed with large iron ore deposits, contracted with China to export 600 thousand tons of ore in 2004 and 1 million tons in 2005. China has shouldered the burden of paying the 100 million yuan (about US$12.4 million) required for plant and equipment investment in North Korea’s Musan Mine for this purpose.

China is moving into Korea in other ways besides investment and trade. China has its own ethnic Korean autonomous region, populated mostly by Koreans who fled to northeast China from their homeland during the era of Japanese rule. Recently the Chinese have ramped up their efforts to educate these ethnic Koreans that they are in fact a subset of ethnic Chinese. Specifically, they claim that the ancient Koguryo Dynasty, which ruled the northern part of the peninsula for several hundred years until 668 A.D., was not a Korean kingdom but in fact belonged to China. By logical extension, the Korean Peninsula can then be viewed as a region originally populated by ethnic Chinese and therefore rightfully Chinese territory.

While the South Korean government has fiercely objected to this argument, no such protestations have been forthcoming from the North. Quite the contrary, the North Koreans praise China’s economic inroads into their country as a form of “reinforcement,” and they welcome the investments and factory construction.

In a very short span of time, China has established an economic sphere of influence in Southeast Asia through its development of the Mekong region. It has formed alliances with countries in Central Asia to obstruct the spread of Islamic radicalism. And it has set up a strategic partnership with Russia through which the two nations are rapidly tightening their military ties. That leaves the east, where China is now pursuing a goal of hegemony over the Korean Peninsula – not by force of arms, but through economic aid. That is, indeed, China’s traditional strategy.

Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst
Topic: Profile
Motoaki Kamiura (photo) is a Tokyo-based military analyst, TV and radio commentator.

When the world is in crisis, he appears frequently on national television programs.

Mr. Kamiura releases his daily analysis in the Japanese language through his website, www.kamiura.com, which receives over 5,000 viewers every day.

His e-mail address is motoaki@kamiura.com.

Alan Gleason is an editor, writer, and Japanese-English translator. He lives in Tokyo.

Will China Swallow Up the Korean Peninsula? (Part 1)
Topic: China
August 2005 Cultural News

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

This past July, China suddenly launched diplomatic offensives on several fronts. First, Chairman Hu Jintao visited Russia and met with President Putin; the two heads of state agreed to form a strategic Russo-Chinese partnership to counter the unilateralist behavior of the United States.

Russia also promised to give China top priority in its oil exports. These agreements became possible when the two countries resolved their long-standing border disputes in June, thus removing the single biggest obstacle to their rapprochement. They also agreed to cooperate in the development of China's Northeast region (formerly known as Manchuria).

Then, starting on July 4, the Chinese hosted the Second Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Summit in Kunming, Yunnan province, with Premier Wen Jiabao attending. Rather than attempt to control the South China Sea with its relatively weak Navy, China seeks to make economic inroads into Southeast Asia via the Mekong River, which it is developing into a major transport artery.

Engineers have blown up rocks that obstruct river traffic and constructed new harbors all along the waterway. Roads have been built from these harbors to more landlocked provinces. All of this construction is funded by China. As a result, the other countries along the Mekong – Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Viet Nam – are now flooded with Chinese goods.

At the GMS Summit, Premier Wen promised even more aid. As payment for agricultural imports from Thailand, China agreed to give the Thais 132 armored vehicles, worth about 40 million dollars. Last year Myanmar completed three hydroelectric power plants with financial assistance from China; now the Chinese have promised to help Laos build a hydroelectric plant too. China in effect has funded a full three-fifths of Myanmar's total electric power output.

China is also laying an oil pipeline to Myanmar. Once it is completed, China will no longer need to transport oil from the Mideast through the Malacca Straits, but over a more secure inland route to Yunnan. China views the U.S. Navy's presence in the Malacca Straits as a threat.

After his summit with President Putin, Chairman Hu attended another summit in Kazakhstan with the leaders of member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Consisting of China, Russia, and the four Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the SCO announced that in exchange for cooperating in the security of Central Asia, China would be supplied with oil and natural gas from Kyrgyzstan.

The summit participants also demanded that the United States announce a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Central Asia. It is inevitable that the nations of this region pay more heed to their giant neighbors, Russian and China, than to American economic assistance or military might.

Thus in a flurry of diplomatic moves, China has enhanced its security and influence on three sides – to the south, through its GMS development programs; to the north, through a strategic alliance with Russia and joint development of the Northeast; and to the west, through its success in uniting Central Asia behind a pro-China, anti-U.S. stance via the SCO.

That leaves the east, and there, China is making preparations to establish its hegemony over the Korean Peninsula. If China can bring the entire peninsula under its influence, it will be like a dagger pointed straight at Japan, as far as the Japanese are concerned. Just how does China propose to go about achieving this? I will attempt to answer that question in the second part of this article.

Much Ado about North Korea's Nuclear Non-Test
Topic: North Korea
June 2005 Cultural News

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

Just as the population of Japan was settling into its annual Golden Week holiday in early May, it was buffeted by a stream of media reports that North Korea would be conducting a nuclear test sometime in June.

The first such announcement appeared in the New York Times. The Times article cited claims by White House and Pentagon officials that frequent convoys of military trucks had been seen visiting a site on the east central coast of North Korea, that an abandoned mine there was being filled in with huge amounts of earth, that an observation platform was being constructed nearby.

The article explained that these were all signs of preparation for an underground nuclear test. The article appeared just before the start of a nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) conference in New York, the first such meeting in five years.

The Times report sent Japan into a panic, and related rumors began to fly thick and fast. North Korea was going to conduct the test because America had ignored the regime’s February declaration that it possessed nuclear weapons.

Or, North Korea’s military badly wanted the test, and leader Kim Jong Il could not ignore the military’s demands. What was more, even an underground test would release radioactivity into the air, sending a deadly fallout cloud in Japan’s direction. One sports tabloid claimed that at the U.S. air base on Guam, B-2 bombers were being readied for a pre-emptive strike to prevent the test.

Major Japanese newspapers quoted a former senior CIA official as saying that North Korea had “five to eight” nuclear weapons on hand. Even Mohamed El Baradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, declared that the possession of nukes by North Korea was a real possibility.

But think about it for a moment. The mission of the U.S. intelligence establishment is not to share, with the entire world, intelligence about North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Rather, its job is to manipulate information in order to mobilize world opinion against the North Korean regime and further isolate it.

The White House, Pentagon, and CIA already have a track record of deliberately leaking information -- including false information -- to the press for such purposes. The current brouhaha most likely began with an intentional leak to a Times reporter of just such disinformation about signs of an impending nuclear test in North Korea. This scenario makes perfect sense in the context of the information war currently being waged.

Eventually, several senior Chinese government officials issued declarations that China would respond in the strongest terms to any nuclear test by North Korea, and that China had sternly warned North Korea not to develop nuclear weapons.

The head of South Korea’s own intelligence agency then announced to members of the South Korean parliament’s intelligence committee that there was no sign of movement by North Korea to conduct a nuclear test, and that reports to that effect were “incorrect.” With that, the hysteria finally subsided.

North Korea is using its “nuclear card” as a bluff to get the United States to negotiate with it directly. In exchange for a promise not to acquire nuclear arms, it hopes to win guarantees for the survival of the Kim Jong Il regime.

However, the U.S. government has its own agenda, which is to intentionally exaggerate these threats by North Korea and use them to demonize and isolate the regime in the eyes of the rest of the world.

The Japanese were thrown into a panic by the nuclear test reports because they do not understand this state of affairs. Their ignorance is due in part to Japan’s lack of its own intelligence-gathering organization, and in part to the appalling lack of military knowledge by the country’s journalists. One can only hope that the Japanese learned something from the recent North Korean nuclear test scare.

Security without Forces?
Topic: US Base
April 2005 Cultural News

Why the U.S. Wants to Move Its Military Headquarters to Japan and Withdraw Its Troops

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

Even with the Cold War long over, the United States military has kept 100,000 troops in East Asia, mostly in Japan and South Korea. Their presence has been part of a strategy of forward deployment to prepare for military contingencies. Stationing all these troops in East Asia is, however, prohibitively expensive for the U.S., and such overseas assignments are not popular with the troops themselves.

Moreover, the noise and crime generated by American military bases in places like Okinawa imposes a heavy burden on local residents. And since there is currently no military draft, the commitment of troops to forward deployment in East Asia exacerbates the severe troop shortage the U.S. is experiencing in its war on terrorism.

Consequently, the U.S. has begun a process of "transformation" of its troop deployments around the world. In East Asia, transformation basically consists of abandoning the forward deployment strategy, pulling U.S. combat forces back to the homeland and a few outposts like Guam, and readying them for rapid deployment anywhere, anytime.

But if the U.S. simply pulls its troops out of East Asia, it will leave a military vacuum in its wake. If China moves in to fill that vacuum, America will lose its presence in East Asia altogether.

Thus the U.S. must find a way to pull its troops back as part of the transformation process without allowing a power vacuum where they used to be. And indeed, far from reducing the U.S. military presence in East Asia, the transformation that is about to begin in Japan has the objective of actually reinforcing that presence.

The American military transformation began with the articulation of common strategic objectives with South Korea and Japan. Without shared objectives, the countries would not be able to cooperate effectively in event of an emergency. Next, the U.S. began consolidating and closing its overseas military bases, returning unneeded facilities to their host countries.

To compensate, U.S. forces reorganized themselves for greater mobility and more rapid deployment abroad, so as to be ready to respond to any contingency. For example, lightweight armored vehicles, which can be moved long distances in a short time by transport plane, have taken priority over heavy tanks. Light vehicles are adequate for combat with guerrillas or terrorists, the thinking goes.

With their lightweight weaponry and hi-tech troops, U.S. forces are well prepared for actual war. The problem is how to increase American influence in East Asia in times of peace. This is a political, not just a military, problem.

The solution devised by the Americans is to place the East Asian headquarters for their Army, Navy and Air Force right in Japan. Headquarters for the Navy's 7th Fleet are already in Yokosuka. Plans call for transfer of the headquarters of the U.S. Army's First Corps from Washington State to Camp Zama outside Tokyo, with an Army officer of full General rank replacing the current Lieutenant General as commander.

And the 5th Air Force headquarters at Yokota Air Base, also outside Tokyo, are to be integrated with the 13th Air Force headquarters in Guam. Yokota will then serve as the Air Force's command center for both East Asia and the West Pacific.

These realignments will ensure that the U.S.-Japan security apparatus enjoys an even bigger presence in East Asia than it does now. And who will guard these various U.S. command posts? Japan's Self-Defense Forces, of course.

In short, the Japanese-American military alliance is moving toward a security arrangement that requires no actual U.S. troops in Japan.

The SDF Comes In From the Cold War
Topic: Self-Defense Force
February 2005 Cultural News

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

Over 200,000 people died in the tsunami that struck countries around the Indian Ocean last December, and a massive worldwide effort has been launched to bring aid to the survivors.

In addition to sending out emergency relief teams, the Japanese government has dispatched over 800 Self-Defense Force (SDF) personnel to the Indonesian island of Sumatra. This includes five transport helicopters (three CH-47s and two UH-60s) and a medical team from the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) (a total of 200 troops); a large transport ship, a supply ship and an escort from the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) (600 troops); and one or two C-130 transport planes from the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) (40 troops).

This may be a drop in the bucket compared to the aircraft carrier and 13,000 troops committed by the United States, but it is the largest single overseas deployment in the history of Japan’s SDF.

Just as significant, this will be the first time the three Self-Defense Force branches have operated together under a single joint command. Coordination of air, sea and land forces is not unusual for the U.S. military, but it is another first for the SDF.

The reason is simple: since the early, prewar days of Japan’s modern armed forces, its Army and Navy have never gotten along. When the Army wanted to invade China, the Navy had its sights set on domination of the West Pacific, and their strategies often clashed (there was no separate Air Force at the time).

Until the establishment after World War II of the National Defense Academy, young officers entering the various branches of the military could not even be trained at the same school. But even in recent years, communications among the SDF’s Ground, Maritime and Air troops have been poor.

In August 1985, a domestic Japan Air Lines jumbo jet crashed in the mountains west of Tokyo, killing 520. SDF troops were dispatched to the site, but the radios of the GSDF ground patrols and the ASDF rescue helicopters could not transmit to each other, seriously hampering rescue operations.

This tragic blunder spurred the various SDFs to subsequently undertake frequent joint-command exercises. Still, formidable barriers remain among the three forces in the field.

As recently as the aftermath of the Niigata earthquake last fall, coordination was abysmal with relief troops dispatched by one branch often unaware of what others in the same district were doing.

Off the coast of Sumatra, however, GSDF troops will use a MSDF transport ship as a hotel ship. And at the rescue command post set up by U.S. forces at Thailand’s Utapao military base, members of the three SDFs will form a joint command to coordinate their activities, while C-130 transport planes will fly supplies from there to ASDF and MSDF troops in Indonesia.

The entire operation, in fact, serves as a trial run for the SDF’s new basic strategy for the era after the North Korea crisis: “defense of the outlying islands.” It is a perfect test case for the more integrated operations planned by the three branches to guard the string of Japanese islands that runs from southern Kyushu nearly to Taiwan.

The ASDF has fighters and attack planes capable of bombing seaborne forces or enemy troops landing on these islands. The MSDF has transport ships for carrying GSDF troops to the islands, and combat ships to assist them. It is precisely this type of coordination by the three branches that the SDF wishes to test.

The purpose of the new strategy is, of course, to check attempts by the Chinese military to expand its sphere of influence from the East China Sea into the West Pacific. However, it would not be accurate to say that Japan anticipates war with China. Rather, Japan hopes that by bolstering its defense of these outlying islands, it can discourage China from engaging in undesirable flexing of its military muscle.

The point of increasing the SDF’s presence in the islands, and indeed, the point of much of Japan’s military planning from now on, is to keep China in check.

Thus Japan’s military has begun the process of sloughing off the cumbersome armor of the Cold War and slipping into something more comfortable – a new, lighter, faster, more flexible SDF.

"Exclusive Defense": An Obsolete Buzzword
Topic: Self-Defense Force
November 2004 Cultural News

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

When Japan created its Self-Defense Forces a half-century ago -- and even 30 years ago, when I enlisted in the SDF -- politicians and constitutional scholars who supported the SDF often trumpeted the concept of "exclusive" or "non-aggressive" defense -- in other words, national defense strictly for defensive purposes -- to drown out any concerns voiced about the constitutionality of Japan's military.

The Japan of today, the rationale goes, would never attack another country. The sole circumstance in which the SDF might engage in combat would be to repel a direct attack on the Japanese mainland by a foreign military force.

Therefore the existence of the SDF does not violate Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which explicitly declares that Japan renounces the "threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes," as well as the maintenance of armed forces to accomplish such aims.

As its appellation is meant to suggest, the SDF exists only to exercise Japan's natural right to self-defense. Hence the term "exclusive defense" to describe the nation's defense policy.

Today, however, a look around Japan's periphery reveals no country with the desire or wherewithal to attack Japan. The only nation capable of such an attack would be the United States, but Japan and the U.S. are allies with a mutual security treaty of many years' standing between them.

Even the militaristic dictatorship of North Korea is paralyzed by domestic problems that seem increasingly likely to topple it. North Korea is clearly not capable of attacking Japan. Nor are China and Russia, both of whom in any case seek friendly relations with Japan.

In these circumstances, the Self-Defense Forces seem to have lost their very raison d'etre. And not only the SDF: the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which ostensibly was signed for the purpose of protecting Japan, seems increasingly meaningless as well.

Meanwhile, thanks to its war-renouncing constitution, Japan cannot send troops to Iraq to actually fight alongside the Americans, nor would the vast majority of the population support such a move. ("Humanitarian assistance" by the SDF, on the other hand, does enjoy public support.)

Thus it is no surprise that the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, a private advisory panel that answers to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, views this as a serious problem and has issued a report recommending that the U.S. and Japan hold talks to redefine the roles of the SDF and the Security Treaty and issue a joint declaration on the subject.

In response, the Japanese government has already made plans to revise its "National Defense Program Outline," a document that summarizes Japan's basic defense strategy, within the year. Clearly the era of "exclusive defense" is over and Japan has already begun the process of developing a new defense strategy to replace it.

However, the government has no idea what this strategy will be. If the SDF offers to work with the United Nations, then it is effectively rejecting the United States' war in Iraq, which was launched in defiance of the U.N.

If the SDF adopts a new mission for itself providing rear-guard support for U.S. forces in Iraq (which would presumably exclude outright combat), this flies in the face of the reality that it would confront insurgents and terrorists who make no distinction between combat and non-combat support of their American enemy.

When the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union came to an end in 1990, the SDF lost its primary potential foe and began to panic. For a time it justified its existence in the post-Cold War era by shifting its focus to a new threat, North Korea, as well as cooperating with international reconstruction efforts and helping out in the aftermath of natural disasters (the Hanshin Earthquake of 1995, for example) at home. When the SDF dispatched troops to Iraq, however, it was confronted for the first time with the risks of following the U.S. into war.

Despite its awareness of the danger inherent in this new role for the SDF, the Japanese government intends to announce a revised defense policy before the year is out. Yet the government has not even figured out just what that new policy should be. The SDF, and the rest of the country, will continue to suffer from this state of uncertainty.

The Japanese Can Say No to Weapons Exports
Topic: Weapon Export
September 2004 Cultural News

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

Japan has begun a reevaluation of its defense strategy. It is in the process of shifting from an era of one grand strategy -- part of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union -- to an era of small-scale strategies for responding to terrorist acts and guerrilla wars in different regions of the world.

Anticipating that there is no longer a risk of a large-scale military attack on its home islands, the Japanese government intends to reduce its purchases of many conventional weapons, including jet fighters, tanks, escort ships, destroyers, and patrol aircraft.

This trend has put Japan's munitions industry, which manufactures weapons exclusively for the use of the country's Self-Defense Forces, in a panic. The industry has appealed to the government to rethink its "three rules of weapons export," and the Defense Agency appears willing to comply.

These "three rules," which have been in force since the sixties, are as follows: Do not sell weapons to nations engaged in war, to Communist nations, or to nations to which arms exports are prohibited by the United Nations. By the seventies, as the number of countries falling into one of these categories proliferated, Japan by default became a country constrained from exporting weapons anywhere.

However, Japan made one salient exception to this rule: the United States. In the eighties, U.S. president Ronald Reagan and Japanese prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone concluded a new agreement that Japan could provide weapons technology to the U.S. Aside from that one loophole, Japan continues to abide by its three rules and does not export weapons to any other country.

Now, however, members of the Japanese business establishment are starting to argue that if this ban remains in place, Japan will fall behind other countries in the technology race. They also gaze longingly at the handsome profits to be made on the world munitions market.

But can Japanese-made weapons really sell on the international market? To be blunt, Japanese tanks, armored vehicles, fighter planes and submarines aren't likely to sell well at all. Performance aside, they're simply too expensive. A Japanese Type 90 battle tank costs three times as much as a U.S.-made M1A2 tank. And in fact, the M1A2 is far and away the better machine.

However, there is one area where Japanese armaments can compete successfully on the world market -- even against the Americans. That is in the field of weapons that use Japan's state-of-the-art consumer appliance technology. Suppose, for example, you equip one of Japan's renowned industrial robots with high-sensitivity sensors and wheels or some other means of transport. Add a machine gun or missile-launcher and you have a first-class robot soldier. A robot can stand guard for 24 hours without a break, and can function in environments -- like burning desert sands or high altitudes -- where humans fare poorly. And if a robot is destroyed by the enemy, it doesn't count as a fatality.

Scenarios like these suggest that big opportunities await Japanese high-tech industries on the world arms market.

However, there are other consequences to consider. Suppose Japan starts churning out weapons for the global market, and reaps massive profits as a result. Japanese industry will then become a beneficiary of wars and conflicts throughout the world. And that is a disturbing possibility. Japan is a country that depends on the outside world for its resources and its markets. Wars and instability anywhere in the world have been viewed as a threat to its economic health, not a blessing.

Most Japanese citizens are well aware of this. They know that Japan's success over the past half-century has been a result of its dependence on peace, not war. If the Japanese government and big business interests try to turn the country into an arms bazaar, the average citizen will not take kindly to this prospect, and will demonstrate his or her displeasure at the ballot box. Government and industry had best keep in mind that voters still have the power to keep Japan a peaceful nation, not one dependent for its livelihood on others' misfortunes.

The SDF Gets Cozy with U.S. Forces
Topic: US Base
July 2004 Cultural News


By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst
Translated by Alan Gleason

The military landscape of Northeast Asia is undergoing a major transition. This summer, the United States will transfer 3,600 of its troops from South Korea to Iraq -- and they will not be returning to South Korea. The U.S. has also notified South Korea that it will reduce its presence in that country by 12,500 troops -- a third of the current number -- by the end of 2005.

Changes are also afoot with American forces in Japan. The U.S. has sounded out the Japanese government about transferring some 2,600 troops of its Third Marine Division from Okinawa to Camp Zama just outside Tokyo. Zama is the headquarters of the U.S. Army in Japan. From there the Marines would be sent out for training exercises at the Yausubetsu Training Range in eastern Hokkaido and Camp Fuji southwest of Tokyo. This transfer would be the first step in the dispersal of U.S. Marines, now concentrated in Okinawa, to other parts of Japan.

The U.S. has also told Japan that it would like to move the headquarters of the U.S. Army's First Corps -- its contingency force for the defense of Japan -- from Fort Lewis in Washington State to Camp Zama. Basing headquarters at Zama would facilitate the rapid deployment of American troops into Japan in the event of an emergency. The strategy resembles what the U.S. did when it moved its Central Command (which directs American military operations in the Middle East) from Florida to Qatar in anticipation of the Iraq War.

The U.S. has further suggested that Japan move the Air Defense Command of the Air Self-Defense Force from Fuchu (in the Tokyo suburbs) to Yokota Air Base. Yokota, not far from Zama, is the general headquarters of U.S. Forces Japan. This would effectively place the Air SDF under the same chain of command as U.S. forces.

All these shifts represent part of an American strategy of worldwide "transformation" of its military command. But just what is the objective of this reorganization? Is it to guard more effectively against a dangerous dictatorship in North Korea? Not at all. The Americans do not really consider North Korea a military threat. They know that the North Korean armed forces are in a state of paralysis; they no longer have the capability to invade the South.

Rather, the transformation of U.S. forces is being triggered by advances in high-tech weaponry and by American concerns about a future military threat from China as well as from Russia in the Far East.

When North Korea inevitably collapses and is reunited with the South, it is a foregone conclusion that the newly unified Korean state will form a military alliance with the United States. China is likely to tolerate this alliance provided that no American troops are actually stationed on the Korean Peninsula.

Why would China put up with this? Because without a U.S.-Korea alliance, there would be nothing to stop Japan from becoming a major military power, which China fears even more. Also, China needs Japanese and American investments to develop the northeast part of the country, so it has to play along to some extent.

For its part, the U.S. is sensitive to the fact that China has missiles that can reach Washington. It wishes to avoid any needless heightening of military tensions with China, as would occur if the U.S. sought a permanent military presence in a unified Korea.

However, the Korean Peninsula already contains the latest in high-tech weaponry, courtesy of the United States. The peninsula effectively serves the U.S. as an outpost guarding the Chinese and Russian borders.

Offshore floats a further line of defense, the Japanese Archipelago. By locating its Far East headquarters in Japan, the U.S. military intends to head off the possibility of invasion from the continent. In short, Japan is to serve as a breakwater protecting the U.S.

This is, in a nutshell, an East Asia Strategy developed by the U.S. for the 21st century. Japanese and American military forces will be joined at the hip. But there is a danger -- in terms of military strategy as well as common sense -- in casting one's lot so completely with a country like the U.S. that offers a handshake with one hand while brandishing a big stick (military might) with the other. Japan risks losing its own identity, not least as a nation that has formally renounced war.

Iraq War and Japan's Self-Defense Forces (4)
Topic: Self-Defense Force
May 2004 Cultural News

Civilian Kidnapping: Not on the Japanese Government's List

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

Three Japanese civilians were kidnapped last month near Fallujah, the scene of fierce fighting between U.S. forces and anti-U.S. insurgents in Iraq. Then, barely a week later, two Japanese freelance journalists were abducted outside Baghdad. The kidnappers of the first three hostages delivered a video to Al Jazeera, the Arabic-language TV broadcasting station. The video showed men in black guerilla garb standing menacingly behind the hostages, brandishing rifles and grenade launchers.

The image had a devastating effect on Japanese viewers, who had never experienced anything like this before. For the first time on the Mideast battlefront, ordinary Japanese citizens were being held hostage, and the condition for their release was the withdrawal of Japan's Self-Defense Forces from Iraq. By the next day, Japan's mass media was filled with heated debate over whether the SDF should withdraw or not.

But the guerillas had another reason for abducting the Japanese. They wanted foreign hostages as human shields to prevent a full-scale attack on Fallujah by U.S. forces, which had the city surrounded. The guerillas had no chance of defeating the Americans, with their planes, tanks and overwhelming firepower. So they kidnapped civilians from countries that would likely put pressure on the U.S. government, and threatened to kill the hostages if the U.S. attacked Fallujah.

As the crisis unfolded, it became obvious that the Japanese government had never anticipated that guerillas opposing the occupation of Iraq would kidnap civilians working for non-governmental organizations there. They expected abductions of Japanese diplomats or SDF troops, not individual volunteers or members of NGOs providing assistance to Iraqis.

This was a big miscalculation by the Japanese -- much like the U.S. miscalculation that Iraqis would greet American troops as liberators if they toppled Saddam Hussein. Just as the kidnapping of a mere five hostages rocked the Japanese government, the U.S. was shocked when some of the Shiites, who were supposed to be its allies, joined the anti-occupation movement. Miscalculations like these are only making the situation in Iraq worse.

Fortunately, the five Japanese hostages were released -- but many other foreigners have been kidnapped and remain in captivity.

No one can condone the abduction of unarmed foreign civilians, but for guerillas fighting a much more powerful foe, it is a common strategy. It is now clear that America cannot control Iraq purely by force of arms. And it is no coincidence that, just as this becomes obvious, we hear news that U.S. President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Blair have suddenly changed their minds and want the U.N. to take over the reconstruction of Iraq.

These recent events have shown the entire world that U.S. military power is not invincible after all. We can only hope that this realization leads to at least some improvement in the situation in Iraq, so that fewer lives are claimed by violence.

Iraq War and Japan's Self-Defense Forces (3)
Topic: Self-Defense Force
March 2004 Cultural News

Where Suicide Bombing is Concerned, Military Forces is of No Use at All

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

When Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi dispatched Self-Defense Force troops to Iraq, he exhorted them to fight undaunted against terrorism. U.S. President George W. Bush has also been urging the global community to join him in battle against Al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin is at war with rebels in Chechnya who seek independence from Russia. On February 6, a Chechen suicide bomber boarded a Moscow subway train during the morning rush hour and set off an explosion that killed 40 passengers.

Many Chechen men have died in battle with the Russians, leaving behind a large population of bereft widows and girlfriends. Many of these women have volunteered to join the ranks of the suicide bombers. With no hope for happiness in this world, they dream of being reunited with their loved ones in the next.

When Japanese people hear about suicide bombers, they tend to assume their motives are similar to those of the young Japanese pilots who volunteered for the "kamikaze" suicide bombing missions in the last days of World War II.

But in Islamic society, there are other reasons why people choose to become suicide bombers. Volunteers are promised that, by committing such acts in the name of holy war, they are ensured a place in heaven. In addition, they have the right to designate up to 40 other people for entry into heaven with them. Thus the suicide bombers can guarantee the salvation of those nearest and dearest to them -- their parents, siblings, friends and helpmates.

In a sense, then, today's suicide bombers are motivated by hope. Many people in Israel have seen the faces of suicide bombers; in most cases, they say, the bomber was smiling just before the explosion. No doubt they were anticipating their imminent arrival in heaven.

My own studies of military affairs have led me to the conclusion that a military solution to suicidal terrorist acts does not exist. Until the attacks of September 11, 2001, who imagined that terrorists would hijack a passenger jet, kill the pilot, take over the controls and willingly fly the plane straight into the World Trade Center? Who can guarantee that a suicide bomber will not board a bullet train in Japan and set off a bomb in the front car as it races along at 170 mph?

Politicians call on their nation's citizens to fight against suicide bombers and other terrorists. But all the military might at a nation's disposal cannot prevent people from committing such acts. The deteriorating situation in Iraq today is ample proof of this.

How then, does one put an end to suicide bombing? This is a question I have given much thought to recently. The only answer I can come up with is that one must eliminate the social conditions that give birth to such acts in the first place: poverty, discrimination, exploitation. The most effective way to prevent suicide bombings is to offer people hope and the will to live. It is the job of politicians to make this happen. But politicians today have abandoned their responsibilities; instead, they speak only of using military force to quash terrorism. No wonder conditions only get worse.

When politicians tell us that we can put an end to terrorism through the use of military force, I don't know what they're talking about. I do know that, at least where suicide bombing is concerned, military force is of no use at all.

Iraq War and Japan's Self-Defense Force (2)
Topic: Self-Defense Force
January 2004 Cultural News

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

The government of Japan has finalized its plans for deployment of Self-Defense Force (SDF) troops to Iraq, and has issued orders to the units to be dispatched. Orders have already gone out to the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) to send three C-130 transport planes to Kuwait in late January, signaling the start of full-scale air transport operations.

Preparations are also underway for the deployment of up to 550 Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) personnel by late April to the city of Samawah in southern Iraq. Plans call for 30 troops to work on purifying water from the Euphrates river, 40 to provide medical assistance, 50 to handle base maintenance, and 300 to serve as headquarters staff, handling communications, meal preparation and other duties.

In addition, the SDF will dispatch a unit of 130 combat-ready infantry to Samawah. Their mission is ostensibly to protect the Japanese contingent, not to engage in regional security operations. But be that as it may, this is the first time in its history that the SDF has dispatched a combat unit to a foreign country.

These GSDF soldiers, who normally carry nothing more powerful than automatic rifles and pistols, will for the first time be armed with 84-mm recoilless rifles and 110-mm anti-tank rocket launchers as well. This is to prevent terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda or the like. If a suicide bomber attempts to drive a car into the SDF compound, for example, troops are authorized to fire their recoilless rifles or rocket launchers.

The Iraq deployment will also mark the first time the SDF has sent a force overseas with armored personnel carriers and other armored vehicles. These are to protect Japanese troops from the automatic weapons fire and mortar attacks so common in Iraq these days.

The Japanese government has settled on three types of construction assistance for the SDF to engage in around Samawah: water purification and supply, medical aid, and hospital and school repair.

The problem is that, all their recoilless guns and armored vehicles notwithstanding, the troops will find it impossible to do any reconstruction work outside of their own compound. The reason is that Iraqi guerrillas will be waiting to ambush them with RPG-7 rocket launchers. Any personnel venturing outside the compound are very likely to come under fire or be targeted by suicide bombers.

Having fought no wars for over a half-century, contemporary Japanese are unaccustomed to suffering combat casualties. If even a few Japanese troops die in Iraq, it will become a major political issue. A single round from an RPG-7 could kill ten soldiers in an SDF armored vehicle and, in so doing, also bring down the entire Koizumi government.

U.S. troops may very well view the SDF presence in Samawah as laughably weak and timid. But in Japan, the overwhelming public sentiment is that there is no justifiable reason for a single Japanese soldier to die in Iraq. Many Japanese alive today have a first-hand understanding of the futility of war. In America, war may be considered just; in Japan it is still considered a crime.

Iraq War and Japan's Self-Defense Force (1)
Topic: Self-Defense Force
October 2003 Cultural News

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason


When President Bush began the war with Iraq, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi quickly voiced his support. Koizumi presumably thought this would make the U.S. government happy. On July 26, after the worst of the war appeared to be over, the National Diet of Japan passed an Iraq Special Measures Law authorizing the dispatch of Self-Defense Force (SDF) troops to Iraq to assist in the reconstruction of the country.

But the Special Measures Law stipulates that the SDF can only be sent to areas where hostilities are not underway. To send troops into a combat zone would violate Japan's Constitution, which expressly prohibits the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. The SDF is authorized to fight only if Japan itself is invaded, and then only on Japanese territory or in the surrounding sea and air.

In 2002, the government decided that SDF troops should participate in peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, on the grounds that their duties would not include combat in war zones. The idea was that the SDF would help repair roads, build hospitals and schools, and the like.

But if Japan sends troops to Iraq now, they will be entering precisely the sort of war zone prohibited by the Constitution. Guerrilla attacks continue to inflict casualties on the U.S. troops in Iraq. So the Japanese government hesitates to deploy its own forces, prompting U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to implore Japan not to "walk away" from its responsibilities as a U.S. ally. The government has responded by sending one "fact-finding" mission after another to Iraq to search for a safe place where the SDF can operate.

Why is the SDF so obsessed with keeping its troops out of danger? Some might say that it's the job of an army -- if that is indeed what the SDF considers itself -- to go to dangerous places when ordered to do so. But the SDF is not quite like conventional armies in other countries. Because of the war-renouncing clause in Japan's Constitution, the use of force by the SDF is severely restricted. Barring an invasion of the homeland, the troops are supposed to observe the same rules that would apply to a police force, using their weapons only in self-defense or to avert danger.

Even if the enemy is armed, SDF soldiers cannot fire their weapons unless and until they are in imminent danger. Normal armies have Rules of Engagement that define when their troops may attack. As long as a soldier follows these rules, he won't get in trouble even if he fires and accidentally kills a child, for example. Not so an SDF soldier, who would be found guilty of murder.

The Special Measures Law clearly states that it applies only to an Iraq that is not at war; otherwise the law would be unconstitutional. Consequently, the SDF troops sent to Iraq will not be allowed to use their weapons. Not a few soldiers are already saying that this is like being sent into a combat zone with one hand tied behind your back. The contradictory nature of the arrangement has many of the troops worried.

But Japan's politicians, lacking as they are in knowledge of military matters, are oblivious to this contradiction. They simply believe that if the U.S. says "come," the troops must go. Some argue that it is cheaper to send troops now than to wait for the U.S. to hand Japan a huge bill for its share of the cost of the war.

At the root of the problem is America's fundamental miscalculation about the Iraq War. The Bush Administration predicted that if it overthrew Saddam Hussein, Iraqi citizens would greet U.S. troops as liberators. Instead, American soldiers find themselves in Iraq as an occupying force facing fierce opposition.

Many Japanese feel that, with President Bush's war clearly a mistake, there is no reason to send SDF troops into this war as reinforcements. If Japanese soldiers begin dying in Iraq, the military alliance between Japan and the U.S. could be thrown into crisis. And needless to say, the Koizumi government responsible for the deployment would fall.

Most Japanese do support the deployment of SDF troops to Iraq to help rebuild the country, but only when it has become safe to do so. Those of us who remember the quagmire that was the Vietnam War believe that the U.S. should hand over authority for the reconstruction of Iraq to the U.N. at the earliest opportunity, and send the vast majority of American troops there home. Otherwise, Iraq will become America's new quagmire.